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Abstract
Zhao et al proposed an efﬁcient mental poker protocol
which did not require using a Trusted Third Party(TTP). The
protocol is efﬁcient and suitable for any number of players
but it introduces a security ﬂaw. In this paper, we propose
two mental poker protocols based on Zhao’s previous work.
The security ﬂaw has been removed and the additional computing cost is small.

1

Introduction

With the growth and popularity of the Internet, online
gambling is becoming increasingly signiﬁcant [10, 16].
Mental poker is one of the most popular games of online
gambling and the fairness of the involved players is challenging from the view point of data security. Mental poker
was ﬁrstly proposed by Shamir et al [13] in 1979 and many
attempts have been made to achieve protocols that would
allow people to play mental poker [8, 14, 9, 1, 15, 4, 5, 6].
Mental poker proposals can be categorized into two
groups depending on whether a TTP is used or not. Mental
poker protocols with a TTP [10, 8, 1] are normally simple
and efﬁcient. However, the assumption of a fully trusted
TTP is not tolerable in online gambling. Mental poker protocols without TTP have been proposed [4, 5, 6, 11]. These
protocols use zero-knowledge proof and the protocols are
not efﬁcient in the shufﬂing and dealing of cards. They
have sound security but not practical in real implementation. Shamir et al [14] utilized commutative cryptosystems
to develop their mental poker protocol without TTP but the
protocol is limited to two players only.
In order to develop an efﬁcient and secure mental poker
protocol which can satisfy all the major requirements of a
real poker protocol and can be used for the purpose of online gambling, Zhao et al [17] have proposed an efﬁcient
TTP-free mental poker protocol based on multiple encryption and decryption of individual cards. The protocol pro-
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posed by Zhao et al introduces a security ﬂaw which was
pointed out by Castellà-Roca et al [2]. In this paper, we
propose two mental poker protocols based on the previous
work of Zhao et al. The security ﬂaw has been removed
and the additional computing cost is small. The proposed
mental poker protocols are TTP-free and efﬁcient. The conﬁdentiality of cards is achieved and the protocol is suitable
for any number of players. The effect of collusion is minimum. If a Dealer is introduced, the strategies of players
are conﬁdential. The trust on the Dealer is limited to the
conﬁdentiality of the strategies only.
Section 2 describes a multiple encryption and decryption system which is the cornerstone of our TTP-free mental poker protocols. Section 3 describes the details of our
mental poker protocols. The initialization of card games,
shufﬂing of a set of cards and the dealing of cards in games
are described. Section 4 discusses the related works. Section 5 gives an overview of the security properties of our
protocols. Section 6 provides the concluding remarks.

2

Multi-Party Encryption and Decryption

In this section, we will discuss a multi-party encryption
and decryption system based on the ElGamal cryptosystem.
Without losing generality, we assume that there are two parties A and B. The two parties employ a common prime number p and have the key pairs:
KA = {(p, αA , kA , βA ) : βA ≡ αA kA ( mod p)}
KB = {(p, αB , kB , βB ) : βB ≡ αB kB ( mod p)}
In KA , kA is the secret key and {p, αA , βA } is the public
key. In KB , kB is the secret key and {p, αB , βB } is the
public key. The multiple encryption and decryption employ
ElGamal’s asymmetric cryptosystem [7]. The multiple encryption and decryption of message x are as follows:
• A chooses random number rA , and the result of encryption of x with A’s public key {p, αA , βA } has two
parts y1A and y2A :
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rA
y1A = αA
mod p
rA
y2A = xβA
mod p

• B chooses random number rB and encrypts the ciphertext of A’s encryption (actually B encrypts y2A ) with
B’s public key {p, αB , βB } and obtains the following
two parts,
rB
mod p
y1B = αB
rA rB
y2AB = xβA βB mod p

Actually, there is no difference whether A or B encrypts
ﬁrst; we will get the same ciphertext y1A , y1B , y2AB .
• A uses his private key kA to decrypt {y1A , y2AB }:
dKA (y1A , y2AB ) = y2AB (y1A kA )−1 = y2B mod p
• B uses his private key kB to decrypt {y1B , y2B } and
obtains x:
dKB y2B ) = y2B (y1B

kB −1

)

= x mod p

x is the original message.

has stacked the deck in the shufﬂing and there is no unexpected information leak in the dealing. In our proposed
protocol, there is not a trusted third party involved during
the game. The proposed protocol in this paper focuses on
the processes of shufﬂing and dealing the cards only and is
suitable for any set of cards. Our protocol deals with cards
one by one which is different from the protocols based on
permutations of cards [8]. Without losing generality, we assume that there are two players Alice and Bob in the card
game and there is no real difference when more players are
involved.

3.1

1. Alice and Bob agree to choose the same 52 tokens for
52 cards, that are suitable encoding set {1, ... , 52}.
2. Alice and Bob agree to choose the same prime number
p.
3. Alice chooses her encryption and decryption key pairs
as follows:
KA = {(p, αA , kA , βA ) : βA ≡ αA kA ( mod p)}
4. Alice has a public/private key pair pka and ska, ska
for the signature by Alice and pka for the veriﬁcation
of the Alice’s signature by others.
5. Bob chooses his encryption and decryption key pairs
as follows:

Actually, there is no difference whether A or B decrypts
ﬁrst; we could use the following formula to express the
whole multi-party decryption
y2AB

dKA ,KB ( y1A , y1B , y2AB ) =
(y1A kA )−1 (y1B kB )−1 = x mod p

The most important characteristic for the above system is
the commutativity of the multiple encryptions and decryptions. The order of the encryptions and decryptions will not
change the result. The mental poker protocol proposed in
next section will employ the above commutative cryptosystem.

3

Mental Poker Protocols

Our target is to design a mental poker protocol for multiple players to play fair on-line mental poker games. The
mental poker protocol must provide fairness for the involved parties. The fair mental poker protocol should cover
both the shufﬂing and dealing of the cards in a fair manner. All the involved players must be sure that nobody

Initialization

KB = {(p, αB , kB , βB ) : βB ≡ αB kB ( mod p)}
6. Bob has public/private key pair pkb and skb, skb for
the signature by Bob and pkb for the veriﬁcation of the
Bob’s signature by others.

3.2

Protocol Description

In this section, we propose two mental poker protocols
based on the cryptosystem with multiple encryptions and
descriptions described in section 2. The ﬁrst protocol referred as protocol A requires brand new encryption and decryption keys for every game. The second protocol referred
as protocol B does not require brand new encryption and
decryption keys for every game. In protocol A, the decryption key is published at the end of the game. In protocol B, the decryption key is secret at any time. The encryption and decryption keys can be reused. In both protocols, the card shufﬂing and dealing are based on the encryption/decryption of individual cards.
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3.2.1

Protocol A

I. Card Shufﬂing
1. Alice chooses a set of secret random numbers {rA1 ,
rA2 , ..., rA52 } and then encrypts original card n with
encryption key {p, αA , βA } and random number rAn
for each card in the card set {1, 2, ..., 52}. The set of
encrypted cards is {EA (1), ..., EA (52)} and the cards
are put in the set with a random permutation. The set
of cards is sent to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a set of secret random numbers {rB1 ,
rB2 , ..., rB52 } and then encrypts card m of the
encrypted card set by Alice with encryption key
{p, αB , βB } and random number rBm for each card in
the set of cards encrypted by Alice. The set of double
encrypted cards is {EAB (1), ..., EAB (52)} and they
are put in the set with a random permutation. Bob signs
the double encrypted cards one by one and sends them
to Alice.
3. Alice signs the double encrypted cards one by one.
The set of cards is {< EAB (1) >ska,skb , ..., <
EAB (52) >ska,skb }. Alice sends them to Bob.
Now the deck of cards has been prepared. All the cards are
encrypted by Alice and Bob with their signatures.
II. Card Dealing
There are 52 cards encrypted by both Alice and Bob. At
the very beginning, the set of available order numbers is
{1, ..., 52}. During the game, if some cards are in players’
hands, the corresponding order numbers are deleted from
the available set. When a player needs a card, the following
protocol is carried out.
1. Alice needs to draw a card n, n is the card order
after the double encryptions. She sends n and <
H(n) >ska to Bob.
2. Bob checks Alice’s signature and then checks that n is
in the available set or not. If it is not in the available
set, Bob sends Alice a suitable message. If it is in the
available set, Bob decrypts the double encrypted card
n. After Bob’s decryption, it becomes EA (n). Bob
sends EA (n), < m, H(EA (n)) >skb to Alice. Bob
deletes n from his available set.
3. Alice checks Bob’s signature and decrypts EA (n) to
open the card and adds the card to her hand. Alice
deletes n from her available set.
III. Fairness Veriﬁcation

At the end of the game, all the involved players publish
their encryption/decryption keys and the players can verify
that all players have played fairly.
3.2.2

Protocol B

I. Card Shufﬂing
1. Alice chooses a set of secret random numbers {rA1 ,
rA2 , ..., rA52 } and then encrypts original card n with
encryption key {p, αA , βA } and random number rAn
for each card in the card set {1, 2, ..., 52}. The set of
encrypted cards is {EA (1), ..., EA (52)} and they are
put in the set with a random permutation P A. Alice signs the set of hash of rAn {n = 1, 2, ..., 52}
to get {< H(rA1 ) >ska , < H(rA2 ) >ska , ..., <
H(rA52 ) >ska }. Alice signs the hash of P A. Alice
sends {EA (1), ..., EA (52)}, < H(P A) >ska and {<
H(rA1 ) >ska , < H(rA2 ) >ska , ..., < H(rA52 ) >ska
} to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a set of secret random numbers {rB1 ,
rB2 , ..., rB52 } and then encrypts card m of the
encrypted card set by Alice with encryption key
{p, αB , βB } and random number rBm for each card
in the set of cards encrypted by Alice. The set of
double encrypted cards is {EAB (1), ..., EAB (52)} and
they are put in the set with a random permutation P B.
Bob signs the set of hash of rBm {m = 1, 2, ..., 52}
to get {< H(rB1 ) >ska , < H(rB2 ) >ska , ..., <
H(rB52 ) >ska }. Bob signs the double encrypted
cards one by one and signs the hash of P B. Bob
sends {< EAB (1) >skb , ..., < EAB (52) >skb }, <
H(P B) >skb and {< H(rB1 ) >skb , < H(rB2 ) >skb
, ..., < H(rB52 ) >skb } to Alice.
3. Alice put her signature on each card in {<
EAB (1) >skb , ..., < EAB (52) >skb }. The set
of cards becomes {< EAB (1) >ska,skb , ..., <
EAB (52) >ska,skb }. Alice sends the doubled signed
cards to Bob.
Now the deck of cards has been prepared. All the cards are
encrypted by Alice and Bob with their signatures.
II. Card Dealing
The card dealing of protocol B is exactly the same as the
card dealing in protocol A. All details of card dealing have
been provided in protocol A and we will not repeat it again
here.
III. Fairness Veriﬁcation
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At the end of the game, all the involved players publish their random permutations and set of random numbers
that they have used in the encryptions of cards in the card
shufﬂing. The players can use the encryption keys and the
random numbers used in the encryptions to check that all
players have played fairly or not.

4

Related Works

The protocols proposed in this paper are closely related
to Shamir et al mental poker [14] and Zhao et al mental
poker [17]. Both of them will be described in this section.

4.1

Shamir et al mental poker

Shamir et al [14] proposed a mental poker protocol based
on RSA cryptosystem. Alice and Bob are the two involved
parties. EA and DA are Alice’s encryption and decryption
functions; EB and DB are Bob’s encryption and decryption
functions respectively. For a message x, EA (DB (x)) =
DB (EA (x)); EB (DA (x)) = DA (EB (x)); EA (EB (x)) =
EB (EA (x)); DA (DB (x)) = DB (DA (x)). The above relations show the commutativity of the encryptions and decryptions in the cryptosystem. Another important characteristic of the cryptosystem is that the encryption key and
decryption key are both secret in the game. The mental protocol is as follows:
1. Alice encrypts each card in a deck of cards {1, ..., 52}
separately and permutes the set in a random order. Alice sends the set {EA (1), ..., EA (52)} to Bob.
2. Bob chooses ﬁve encrypted cards at random, for example {EA (6), EA (8), EA (17), EA (25), EA (33)}, and
sends them to Alice, Alice can decrypt them and know
that they are {6, 8, 17, 25, 33}.
3. Bob chooses ﬁve different encrypted cards, for
example {EA (3), EA (11), EA (19), EA (23),
EA (41)}, encrypts them with his secret key and
sends them back to Alice in a randomly ordered
set {EB (EA (3)), EB (EA (11)), EB (EA (19)),
EB (EA (23)), EB (EA (41))}.
4. Alice decrypts cards one by one and sends Bob
the resulting set {EB (3), EB (11), EB (19), EB (23),
EB (41)}. Bob can decrypt and know that they are {3,
11, 19, 23, 41}.
5. At the end of the game, they could exchange their encryption keys and verify that all players have played
fairly.
Lipton [12] analyzed the above proposal and found that
there was at least one bit of information leak. The information leak comes from the judgement of quadratic residue on

the number which stands for a card in the mental poker protocol. For a number x, if x ≡ y 2 (mod n) for some y, x is a
quadratic residue modulo n; otherwise, x is non-quadratic
residue. All keys must be odd numbers, and xk (mod n) is
a quadratic residue if and only if x is. If the players know
a card is quadratic residue or not, they can know one bit information about the card based on that the encrypted card
is quadratic residue or not. There is no guarantee to get rid
of the one bit information leak even the above mental poker
protocol modiﬁed based on Lipton’s suggestions [3].

4.2

Zhao et al mental poker

Zhao et al [17] proposed a mental poker proposal based
on the ElGamal’s cryptosystem with the commutativity of
multiple encryptions and descriptions. In the protocol, Alice and Bob are the players and they have key pairs:
KA = {(p, αA , kA , βA ) : βA ≡ αA kA ( mod p)}
KB = {(p, αB , kB , βB ) : βB ≡ αB kB ( mod p)}
Alice and Bob agree with that the card deck is represented
by 52 tokens {x1 , x2 , ..., x52 }. The protocol is as follows:
1. Alice chooses a secret random number rA , and then
encrypts original cards one by one. The set of encrypted cards is {EA (1), ..., EA (52)} in a random order. Alice signs the hash function of rA to get <
H(rA ) >ska . Alice sends {EA (1), ..., EA (52)} and
< H(rA ) >ska to Bob.
2. Bob chooses a secret random number rB , and then encrypts original cards one by one. The set of encrypted
cards is {EB (1), ..., EB (52)} in a random order. Bob
signs the hash function of rB to get < H(rB ) >skb .
Bob sends {EB (1), ..., EB (52)} and < H(rB ) >skb
to Alice.
3. Alice encrypts the set of cards encrypted by Bob and
gets {EAB (1), ..., EAB (52)}. Alice sends the results
to Bob.
4. Bob encrypts the set of cards encrypted by Alice and
gets {EBA (1), ..., EBA (52)}. Bob sends the results to
Alice.
5. Alice checks two sets of double encrypted cards with
a different encryption order. If the two sets are not
equal, then the protocol will be stopped. If they are
equal, Alice signs the double encrypted cards one by
one. With the notation C[n] = EAB (n) where (n =
{1, ..., 52} is the order number of cards, Alice gets {<
H(C[1]) >ska , ..., < H(C[52]) >ska }. Alice signs
the order of cards and gets < C[1], ..., C[52] >ska .
Alice sends the double encrypted cards, signatures of
cards and signed order of cards to Bob.
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6. Bob checks the set of double encrypted cards and their
signatures by Alice. Bob checks two sets of double
encrypted cards with a different encryption order. If
the checks are successful, Bob signs double encrypted
cards again and gets
{< H(C[1]) >ska,skb , ..., < H(C[52]) >ska,skb
}. Bob signs the order of cards again and gets <
C[1], ..., C[52] >ska,skb . Bob sends signatures of
cards and signed order of cards to Alice.
Now the deck of cards has been prepared. All the cards
are encrypted by Alice and Bob with their signatures. At
the very beginning, the set of available cards is {1, ..., 52}.
During the game, if some cards are in players’ hands, the
corresponding order numbers are deleted from the available
set. When a player needs a card, the following protocol is
carried out.
1. Alice needs to draw a card m, m is the card order after the double encryptions. She sends m and
< H(m) >ska to Bob.
2. Bob checks Alice’s signature and then checks that m
is in the available set or not. If it is not in the available
set, Bob sends Alice a suitable message. If it is in the
available set, Bob decrypts the double encrypted card
m. The original order of the card is n, the card m is
C[n]. After Bob’s decryption, it becomes EA (n). Bob
sends EA (n), < m, H(EA (n)) >skb to Alice. Bob
deletes m from his available set.
3. Alice checks Bob’s signature and decrypts EA (n) to
open the card and adds the card to her hand. Alice
deletes m from her available set.
When the game is over, Alice and Bob reveal their secret
random number rA and rB . Both Alice and Bob can check
whether the other party has been cheating or not.
The above protocol is computationally efﬁcient and fast.
Unfortunately, the protocol introduces a security ﬂaw. The
nature of ElGamal encryption is to multiply the original
message by a hiding factor. In the above protocol, a player
uses the same random number to encrypt all cards. All cards
are encrypted by multiplying the same hiding factor. The security ﬂaw of the protocol is that the common hiding factor
could be calculated with the method introduced by CastellàRoca et al [2].

5

Discussion

In this section, we discuss some important properties of
mental poker protocols proposed in this paper. We compare
our protocols with previously published protocols. The discussions are related to the details of proposed protocols in
section 3, Shamir et al mental poker and Zhao et al mental
poker in section 4.

5.1

Conﬁdentiality of Cards

In order to design mental poker based on encryptions
and decryptions of individual cards, Shamir et al designed a
mental poker protocol based on RSA cryptosystem [13, 14].
Shamir et al mental poker is efﬁcient but there is at least
one bit information leak [12, 3]. To avoid the information
leak, Zhao et al [17] proposed an efﬁcient TTP-free mental poker based on ElGamal cryptosystem. Unfortunately,
Zhao’s mental poker introduced a security ﬂaw [2]. The
security ﬂaw comes from the reusing of the same random
number in the encryptions of the whole set of cards. In the
proposed protocols in this paper, different random numbers
are used in the encryptions of the set of cards. The mentioned security ﬂaw is removed and the other characteristics
of Zhao’s mental poker have been kept. The conﬁdentiality
of cards is achieved.

5.2

Third Parties in Mental Poker

There are different trust assumptions for the involved
third party. If the third party knows the card information
in the shufﬂing and dealing of cards, we call it Card Salesman. If the third party does not know the card information in the shufﬂing and dealing of cards, we call it Dealer.
The Dealer can know the card information after the game.
There are some mental poker protocols with a Card Salesman [10, 8, 1]. The Card Salesman is a trusted third party
and he will cause serious trust and security issues when
mental poker is used in real gambling. There is a strong
desire to get rid of Card Salesman and design real TTP-free
mental poker. The protocols proposed in this paper have
achieved the above requirements. A Dealer may be involved
in mental poker for the conﬁdentiality of strategy of players.
If a mental poker requires players to reveal all information
to peers at the end of game, the strategies of players are
published and it is impossible for the players to bluff. If a
Dealer is involved, the above situation can be changed. The
Dealer will check the fairness of the running of the mental
poker at the end of a card game. The Dealer does not know
the cards in the shufﬂing and dealing but he is able to check
the fairness of the whole game at the end. The Dealer is
the only person who can know the strategy of each player.
In the process of shufﬂing and dealing of protocol A and
protocol B, all the information for checking will be sent to
the Dealer instead of peer players. At the end of the game
in protocol A, the Dealer is the only one who receives the
encryption/decryption keys and verify that all players have
played fairly. At the end of the game in protocol B, all the
involved players reveal their random permutations and the
set of random numbers to the Dealer only. The Dealer can
use the encryption keys and the random numbers to check
that all players have played fairly or not.
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5.3

Multiple Players and Collusion

The protocols proposed in this paper are based on a cryptosystem with the commutativity of multiple encryptions
and decryptions. It is convenient to expand these protocols
to multiple players. In a card game, cards are encrypted by
all the players and the protocols can achieve minimal effect
of collusion. When some players collude, they can not get
more information than the cards on their hands. A card can
be opened only when all players have decrypted it. Any
subset of players can not know anything about the cards of
other players. No collusion can get information about cards
untouched and cards in the hands of honest players.

5.4

Clarity and Efﬁciency

The protocols proposed in this paper are based on multiple ElGamal encryptions/decryptions. The protocols are
simple and clear from the view point of understanding. The
protocols are efﬁcient as well. If there are n players in a
game, there are maximum 52 × n ElGamal encryptions and
52 × n ElGamal decryptions. In protocol A, a new game
needs a new encryption/decryption key pair. In protocol B,
the encryption/decryption key pair can be reused in multiple
games. The fairness checking in protocol A is easier than
that in protocol B. To compare with Zhao’s mental poker
[17], the additional computing cost is that each player needs
to generate 52 random numbers instead of one random number. The increasing computing cost is quite limited.

6

Conclusion

The mental poker protocols proposed in this paper are
updated versions of Zhao’s mental poker [17]. The security
ﬂaw [2] in Zhao’s mental poker has been removed by using
different random numbers for the encryption of each card in
card shufﬂing. The proposed protocols are secure, efﬁcient
and are suitable for any number of players. To compare with
Zhao’s mental poker, the additional computing cost of proposed protocols is quite small. The protocols have got rid of
the Card Salesman who knows all the cards when the card
game is being played and the collusion of players is limited to revealing the cards on the hands of cheating players.
There is no third party involved in protocol A and protocol
B. If a Dealer is introduced in these protocols, the strategies
of players become conﬁdential to peer players. The Dealer
does not know the cards in the shufﬂing and dealing but he
knows the strategies of players after the game.
The Internet has become an important marketplace for
online gambling. Card games are popular for people to
gamble over the Internet. The protocols proposed in this paper are suitable for the purpose of online gambling [10, 16].
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